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ABSTRACT 
This study seeks to understand the adverse impact of related party transactions (RPTs) on the 
internationalization of emerging economy firms. The study further explores how a firm’s 
ownership structure moderates the relationship between RPT and internationalization. Based on a 
sample of 367 Indian manufacturing firms, the study finds that RPTs have a negative influence on 
internationalization. Business group ownership is found to strengthen the negative relationship 
between RPTs and internationalization, whereas foreign shareholding weakens this relationship.  
 
Key words: Emerging market, related party transaction, internationalization, ownership structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
With the increase in liberalization and lowering of trade barriers, emerging market firms 
(EMFs) are internationalizing at a faster pace (Nair et al., 2015). According to UNCTAD, the 
outflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) from developing economies to developed economies 
has increased from 12 percent in 2000 to 39 percent in 2014 (UNCTAD, 2014). Although there 
has been considerable research on the determinants of EMF internationalization (Gaur et al., 2014; 
Peng et al., 2008; Sahaym and Nam, 2013), with increasing focus on firms’ governance 
characteristics (Arregle et al., 2015; Lien et al., 2005; Majocchi and Strange, 2012; Pan et al., 
2014; Pukall and Calabrò, 2014), the role of related party transactions (RPTs) remains largely 
unexplored (Liu and Ooi 2018). Given that corporate governance attributes have significant effects 
on internationalization (Calabrò et al., 2013; Strange et al., 2009), exploring the impact of RPTs 
is also essential.  
Based on these gaps, the present study has two objectives. First, it will examine the impact 
of RPTs on EMF internationalization. Second, we explore how ownership structure could enhance 
or dampen the adverse effects of RPTs on internationalization. Thus, we explore how business 
groups (BGs) and foreign investors’ shareholding influences the relationship between RPTs and 
internationalization. 
RPTs can be defined as the transfer of resources from a focal firm or any of its subsidiaries 
to a related party (Jiang et al., 2010). “Related party” refers to controlling shareholders, directors, 
or any group that can influence the company, such as affiliates, subsidiaries, joint ventures, or 
other firms interrelated through the common ownership of the focal firm’s controlling 
shareholders. This transfer, generally referred to as “tunneling,” takes place through cash 
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injections, credit provision, or debt guarantees (Chang and Hong, 2000; Chung et al., 2004; 
Friedman et al., 2003; Jiang et al., 2010).  
We specifically assert that since RPTs are generally associated with accounting fraud 
(Henry et al., 2007) and misappropriation of value for minority shareholders (Huyghebaert and 
Wang, 2012; Bona-Sanchez et al., 2017), they are considered a negative aspect of corporate 
governance (Lo et al., 2010; Ho and Wong, 2001). As poor corporate governance practices 
adversely impact internationalization (Sanders and Carpenter, 1998), RPTs also act as deterrents 
to internationalization. This is especially likely to be true for EMFs as they suffer from liability of 
emergingness (LOE) (Zhou, 2013). LOE explains the additional disadvantage that firms from 
emerging markets suffer for belonging to emerging rather than developed markets, which 
decreases their legitimation among stakeholders. RPTs signal potential fraud and weak corporate 
governance, so when firms from emerging markets internationalize with high RPTs, their 
legitimacy decreases, and barriers to internationalization are enhanced. We further assert that the 
impact of RPTs on internationalization is contingent on the ownership structure of the firm. 
One unique characteristic of some emerging markets, such as India, is the presence of BGs 
(Douma et al., 2006). BGs have a tendency to tunnel money from a growing business to a poorly 
performing business through RPTs (Jia et al., 2013; Kali and Sarkar, 2011). As the group’s 
ownership concentration in a business increases, they have more incentives to use RPTs 
inappropriately, at the cost of the interest of minority shareholders. Firms incurring RPTs are not 
seen in a positive light (Kohlbeck and Mayhew, 2010), and a high ownership concentration is 
likely to make this effect even stronger, resulting in more hindrances to internationalization. 
Foreign investors, on the contrary, can dampen the negative impact of RPTs on 
internationalization, as they are often associated with improved corporate governance (Aggarwal 
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et al., 2011; Humphery-Jenner and Suchard, 2013). Thus, if RPTs occur in the presence of foreign 
investors, they are likely to be considered efficiency enhancing tools. This implies that as the 
ownership concentration of foreign investors increases, the adverse impact of RPTs on 
internationalization is likely to decrease. 
Based on a sample of 367 Indian manufacturing firms, we find evidence in support of these 
hypotheses. As predicted, RPTs negatively influenced internationalization. The ownership 
concentration of BGs and foreign investors moderated the relationship such that with an increase 
in the ownership concentration of BGs, the negative impact of RPTs on internationalization 
increased, and with an increase in foreign investors’ ownership, the negative impact of RPTs on 
internationalization decreased.  
Our study contributes to the ongoing research about internationalization and corporate 
governance in emerging markets in three ways. First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
empirical study on the impact of RPTs on firms’ internationalization. Extant literature has explored 
RPTs and their impact on firms’ performance outcomes (Kohlbeck and Mayhew, 2010). Our 
findings indicate that RPTs not only influence performance outcomes, but can also significantly 
affect firms’ strategic decisions, such as the decision to internationalize. Our second contribution 
is to the business group literature on emerging markets. Evidence on the effectiveness of BGs in 
emerging markets has been mixed, with some scholars suggesting such groups are parasites or 
value destroyers, while others consider them paragons (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007; Tajeddin and 
Carney, 2018). In the context of RPTs, BGs have been found to have both a tunneling and a 
propping effect (Bae et al., 2002; Bertrand et al., 2002). We resolve this dilemma of the dual roles 
of BGs by exploring the impact of ownership concentration in focal firms, rather than merely the 
group affiliation that extant literature has largely focused on (Chari, 2013; Fisman and Wang, 
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2010; Iona et al., 2013; Kim, 2009; Kim and Song, 2017; Nekhili and Cherif, 2011; Gaur and 
Kumar, 2009; Gaur et al., 2014; Singh and Gaur, 2013).  
Studies that have explored the ownership concentration of BGs have investigated the 
groups’ direct impact on internationalization (Bhaumik et al., 2010; Majocchi and Strange, 2012; 
Ray et al., 2018) rather than the moderating effects. Our study thus deviates from previous studies 
and explains how the ownership concentration of BGs in a focal firm creates a boundary condition, 
especially in the context of the relationship between RPTs and internationalization. 
Third, we contribute to the literature on internationalization of emerging markets by 
exploring contingent effects of the ownership concentration of foreign investors. EMF 
internationalization is challenging due to LOE and liability of foreignness (LOF) (Bangara et al., 
2012; Madhok and Keyhani, 2012). In this context, we explain the role of foreign investors in 
limiting the negative impact of RPTs on internationalization. 
This paper proceeds as follows. We present the extant literature on RPTs and 
internationalization and develop our hypotheses in Section 2, followed by the methodology in 
Section 3 and the results in Section 4. Finally, we present our discussion and conclusion in Section 
5. 
2.0 Literature review and hypothesis development 
2.1 Internationalization of EMFs 
Internationalization augments the agency problem, as the management team requires 
increased levels of discretion. This raises the need for appropriate corporate governance 
arrangements to ensure alignment between management and shareholders’ interests. Despite the 
significance of corporate governance factors for internationalization, a relatively scant stream of 
literature has explored different governance factors that could influence internationalization. 
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Sanders et al. (1998) found that as internationalization required greater information processing and 
knowledge of international markets, and Barroso et al. (2011) emphasized the role of board traits 
on internationalization.  
Among corporate governance factors, the role of family ownership and management in 
influencing the internationalization of EMFs has been widely studied (Chittoor et al., 2015). 
Leveraging the agency theory, scholars have explained how heterogeneity in the ownership 
structures and concentration of family firms influences firms’ internationalization strategies (Ray 
et al., 2018). Singh and Delios (2017) reported that EMFs with higher percentages of independent 
board members and CEO duality were more likely to internationalize than peer firms. Similarly, 
Singh and Gaur (2013) reported the positive influence of group affiliation and family ownership 
on EMF internationalization. Although several governance factors have been explored in the 
context of internationalization, the impact of RPTs, which are a common phenomenon in emerging 
markets (Cheung et al., 2009), has not been investigated.  
2.2 RPTs and their outcomes  
The effectiveness of RPTs has been broadly examined under two theories, efficient 
transaction hypothesis theory and conflict of interest theory, with the former promoting the 
positive impact of RPT on firms and the later citing adverse effects of RPT (Pizzo, 2013). 
According to the efficiency hypothesis theory, RPTs could help firms reduce their transaction 
costs, respond to environmental uncertainties, enforce optimal contracts, and enhance efficiency 
through deeper knowledge of related parties, which is not possible when relationships with parties 
are kept at arm’s length (Coase, 1937; Pizzo, 2013; Williamson, 1988). 
Conflict of interest theory, on the contrary, suggests that through RPTs, firms can use their 
power to expropriate wealth for personal gains (Boateng et al., 2017). This opportunistic behavior 
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among related parties could increase agency costs and reduce the wealth of other stakeholders. 
RPTs could also potentially violate the arm’s-length relations that are assumed in regular market-
based transactions. This impairs the representational faithfulness and verifiability of financial 
statements and performance claims by firms (Habib et al., 2015).  
The adverse impact of RPTs, as predicted by conflict of interest theory, has been widely 
reported in the finance literature. For instance, La Porta et al., (2000) found that related party 
lending was a manifestation of looting. Cheung et al. (2009) mentioned that RPTs led to the erosion 
of shareholders’ wealth. Claessens et al. (2002) and Downs et al. (2016) observed that large 
controlling shareholders were able to channel corporate resources towards projects that generally 
benefitted controlling owners but not necessarily minority owners; this also dampened firms’ 
market valuation (Cherif, 2017; Moscariello, 2012; Nekhili and Cherif, 2011). Firms that engaged 
in RPTs were also more likely to engage in financial misstatement (Kohlbeck and Mayhew, 2017), 
although this varied with the type of RPTs (Fang et al., 2018).  
Given the financial casualties associated with RPTs predicted by the conflict of interest 
theory, RPT is considered a suspicious corporate activity by stakeholders (Chen and Chein, 2007). 
It is generally seen as more of a manipulative than value-enhancing tool (Lo and Wong, 2016), 
thus signaling poor corporate governance. 
2.3 RPTs and internationalization of EMFs 
In emerging markets, human capital and financial markets are not well-developed. They 
also suffer from weak legal and regulatory markets. All this gives rise to institutional voids 
(Khanna and Palepu, 2000). Consequently, most family firms exist as BGs, which substitute the 
imperfect markets and voids with their internal capital markets. A “business group” refers to a set 
of family firms that are legally independent but bound together through a network of formal and 
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informal ties among the families who own these firms as the corporate parent (Khanna and Rivkin, 
2001; Yiu et al., 2005). 
 These business groups are resource-rich and have internal capital markets that they use to 
allocate capital among member firms. Although allocation of capital from internal markets may 
benefit member firms to whom capital has been allocated, it may not reflect the most efficient form 
of capital allocation among member firms (Almeida et al., 2015). This is because resources are 
generally transferred from financially well-performing firms to poorly performing firms, which 
may or may not have the capability to improve their performance (Stein, 1997). For instance, 
researchers have found that in China, controlling shareholders used RPTs to extract resources for 
personal benefit (tunneling), leaving minority shareholders at a disadvantage due to the transfer of 
resources to inefficient firms (Cheung et al., 2006; Jian and Wong, 2010; Jiang et al., 2010; Peng 
et al., 2010).  
This, accompanied by other adverse effects, makes an RPT likely to be perceived by 
stakeholders, such as creditors, lenders, and capital markets, as a tool for misappropriation of 
resources (Jiang et al., 2010; Khanna and Palepu, 2000). Overall, in an institutional context where 
internal capital markets exist and investor rights are only weakly protected, RPT is likely to signal 
poor corporate governance, thus adversely influencing firm internationalization. 
As firms internationalize, it is necessary for them to legitimize their expansion in host 
countries (Ramachandran and Pant, 2010). Legitimacy of a firm in a host country is often 
determined by its organizational image, how the organization is perceived by the relevant outside 
stakeholders (Dutton et al., 1994). This image is determined in part by the firm’s corporate 
governance practices (Pólos et al., 2002); poor governance norms, such as RPTs, adversely 
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influence the firm’s legitimacy in the eyes of stakeholders in host countries (Zuckerman, 1999; 
Bear et al., 2010).  
As RPTs are associated with fraudulent financial reporting, diminished firm value, and so 
on, stakeholders may consider firms indulging in RPTs illegitimate and therefore reduce the firm’s 
credit-worthiness and implement stringent lending norms (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006). This 
could dampen a firm’s ability to raise capital, especially for risky ventures such as 
internationalization (Barkema and Drogendijk, 2007). The adverse effects of illegitimation arising 
from RPTs, are likely to be even higher for EMFs than for firms in developed markets, as they 
suffer from LOE (Ramachandran and Pant, 2010). This liability arises out of the poorly developed 
financial markets and institutional voids in these countries, which raise the risk and volatility 
associated with emerging markets. Because of poor institutional environments and weak legal 
protection for investors, it is often believed that emerging markets have poor corporate governance 
practices (Bell et al., 2014). BG firms’ investment in RPTs is likely to aggravate this negative 
perception, because inefficient usage of internal capital markets and associated deterioration in 
firms’ value makes access to capital resources even more difficult for internationalization. 
Regarding emerging markets, Ghemawat (2007) stated, “The country of origin matters—even for 
capital, which is often considered stateless” (p. 143). Thus, RPTs hinder internationalization for 
BG firms by enhancing the inhibitions of creditors as well as external agencies, such as credit 
rating agencies and regulators; poor corporate governance and illegitimation thus make access to 
capital and international markets difficult. Hence, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1. RPTs negatively influence internationalization for EMFs. 
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2.4 Moderating role of shareholding percentage of business group family members 
The degree of family ownership influences BGs’ ability to exercise their controlling rights 
and influence a firm’s strategic direction, such as internationalization (Ray et al., 2018). Agency 
theory asserts that with increasing ownership, the risk propensity of owners decreases (Beatty and 
Zajac, 1994; Denis et al., 1997). When family members of a BG have a high ownership 
concentration, they bear a significant amount of socio-emotional wealth associated with the firm, 
which discourages them from taking any risky initiatives, such as internationalization, even if the 
initiative implies better financial returns (George et al., 2005; Liu et al., 2011).  
Internationalization involves significant risk-taking, especially for emerging-market firms, 
as their extant experience in managing operations overseas has been negligible due to a closed 
economy. With concentrated ownership, this adverse influence on internationalization is likely to 
be higher, as family members of BGs have little incentive to create value for minority shareholders 
by taking risky initiatives. Extant literature supports this risk-averse behavior of firms with 
concentrated family ownership toward strategic moves such as internationalization (García -Marco 
and Robles-Fernandez, 2008). As ownership concentration of BG family members increases, BGs 
invest in developing resources that pertain to the institutional framework of the home country, thus 
keeping them location bound, further distracting them from developing internationally transferable 
resources and diminishing the ability to internationalize (Tan and Meyer, 2010). 
Apart from this, BG firms are hesitant to subject themselves to the scrutiny of external 
regulators, investors, creditors, and other stakeholders, which is required to complete due diligence 
processes and make capital markets accessible for internationalization (Bhaumik et al., 2010). To 
date, only the direct impact of ownership concentration of BGs has been examined in the 
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international business literature. We assert that it can influence other governance factors, such as 
RPTs, on internationalization as well. 
BGs, by virtue of their internal capital markets, have the ability to indulge in RPTs. The 
extent to which misappropriation takes place depends on the ownership concentration of BG 
family members in focal firms from whom resources are likely to be misappropriated. A prominent 
view in the finance literature based on agency theory asserts the “tunneling role” of BGs, wherein 
minority shareholders are expropriated and resources diversified to the advantage of controlling 
shareholders (Jiang et al., 2010). The tunneling effect is likely to be higher with an increased 
ownership concentration of BG family members.  
Recently, scholars have advanced a coinsurance view of RPTs, where tunneling effects co-
exist with propping effects, the welfare-enhancing effects of BGs (Fisman and Wang, 2010). Given 
the fraudulent activities associated with RPTs (Louwers et al., 2008), with increasing ownership 
concentration of a BG in a focal firm, the illegitimating effects of RPT on internationalization are 
likely to increase. In a weak institutional environment, BGs would have incentives for 
opportunistic earnings management through RPTs and thus indulge in negative governance 
practices, an effect likely to increase with their ownership concentration. (Kim and Yi, 2006). 
Extant literature also reveals that a firm’s market valuation deteriorates with an increase in 
ownership concentration after majority shareholders indulge in manipulative financial practices to 
maximize their compensation (Douma et al., 2006). 
Overall, with an increasing ownership concentration of family members of a business 
group, in emerging markets, where investor rights are only poorly protected, due to enhanced 
misappropriation of shareholders’ wealth, RPTs are likely to illegitimatize a firm’s image for 
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stakeholders, further constraining resources for internationalization and adversely impacting the 
firm’s ability to internationalize. Hence, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2. The concentration of family ownership in a BG moderates the relationship between 
RPTs and internationalization, such that when family ownership concentration is high, there is a 
greater decrease in internationalization associated with the increase in RPTs than when family 
ownership concentration is low.  
2.5 Moderating role of shareholding of foreign investors 
External investors, such as institutional investors from banks, investment firms, or venture 
capital firms, play a critical role in monitoring managers and suggesting strategic actions, which 
influences a firm’s governance and performance in several ways. First, economic goals are pursued 
more aggressively by top management due to performance pressure from these investors (Nashier 
and Gupta, 2016). Second, through voting as a governance tool, investors punish errant managers 
(Mallin, 2012). Third, through shareholder activism, they influence the firm’s strategic decisions 
(Gillan and Starks, 2003). Fourth, the firm’s resource position is augmented by virtue of the tacit 
and explicit knowledge that these investors bring from their diverse networks (Zhou et al., 2016). 
Consequently, investors can influence the firm’s internationalization (George et al., 2005; 
Humphery‐ Jenner and Suchard, 2013).  
Foreign investors have been found to positively influence internationalization (Cerrato and 
Piva, 2012; Douma et al., 2006; Gül et al., 2010; Tainio et al., 2001), particularly that of EMFs 
(Hoskisson et al., 2000; Humphery‐ Jenner and Suchard, 2013). Foreign ownership imparts a 
greater knowledge of the international environment and is indicative of a wider view of markets 
(Fernández and Nieto, 2006). Foreign investors encourage high-risk (Markowitz, 1991), high-
commitment internationalization decisions (Filatotchev et al., 2008; Strange et al., 2009), as they 
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have incentive to sell their stakes unless the firms in which they have invested sustain capital 
market gains. Since internationalization generally leads to increases in stock prices (Gubbi et al., 
2010), foreign investors are likely to motivate firms to undertake foreign expansions. 
Foreign institutional investors (FIIs) from developed market economies may afford EMFs 
access to a global pool of financial resources. FIIs are also experienced in coping with 
opportunistic behavior and have an in-depth understanding of risk/return relationships in 
international cultural settings (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). For instance, if internationalization 
requires considerable capital outlays to establish foreign operations, and further payoff from such 
investments is uncertain, FIIs with greater understanding of the risk/benefit trade‐ offs in the 
global context could positively influence internationalization outcomes. Drawing on their global 
investment experiences, FIIs can provide family firms access to strategic expertise and knowledge 
to help them expand internationally (Tihanyi et al., 2003), particularly through the outflow of FDI.  
If firms have a high level of investment by FIIs, they are likely to have frequent and deep 
engagement with FII representatives, which could enhance new knowledge creation, thus 
overcoming the regional orientation and strategic stagnation of focal firms (Miller et al., 2008). A 
greater presence of foreign ownership helps firms improve their understanding of international 
markets, minimize the fear of the unknown, and avail themselves of the benefits of 
internationalization. 
The strategic role of foreign investors in the internationalization of EMFs is well 
established (Chittoor et al., 2015; Douma et al., 2006; Filatotchev et al., 2008). As EMFs 
internationalize, they may experience challenges posed by institutional differences, such as the 
liabilities of foreignness, emergingness, and newness (Bangara et al., 2012). EMFs may lack 
technological and international marketing capabilities, which are vital to compete in global 
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markets (Stucchi, 2012; Yiu et al., 2005). EMFs can mitigate these problems by finding 
appropriate partners in international markets, leveraging the network resources of foreign investors 
(Fernández and Nieto, 2006). Regular contact with FIIs can also facilitate access to intermediaries, 
such as investment bankers or legal experts and consultants. This community of professionals who 
are conversant with the international assets market could further help EMFs be more informed 
about the risks and benefits of internationalization, the availability of various avenues for financial 
support, and so on. This alters risk perceptions about the internationalization of EMFs (Carpenter 
et al., 2003, p. 806). 
Furthermore, foreign investors have superior monitoring abilities and induce transparency 
in firms. Although RPTs are generally associated with opportunistic earnings management and 
tunneling, firms can utilize a high volume of such transactions without engaging in any accounting 
or financial fraud (Wong et al., 2015). Under certain contingencies, RPTs could enhance a firm’s 
operating efficiency. Some companies, by investing in joint ventures, obtain faster access to 
supplies or markets and thus reduce business risk (Kohlbeck and Mayhew, 2010). This is the 
reason that no country prohibits the use of RPTs (Djankov et al., 2008). This implies that if RPTs 
are governed properly, they can be beneficial for firms and even enhance the internationalization 
of firms. We assert that foreign investors could be beneficial to this end, decreasing the negative 
impact of RPTs on internationalization. Improving overall governance practices enhances an 
EMF’s reputation and credibility in international markets, even in the presence of RPTs, thus 
diminishing RPTs’ adverse impact on internationalization. Hence, as foreign investors’ equity 
ownership in EMFs increases, the impact of RPTs on internationalization decreases. We 
hypothesize: 
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Hypothesis 3. Equity ownership by foreign investors moderates the relationship between RPTs 
and internationalization, so that when the concentration of foreign ownership is greater, the 
decrease in internationalization associated with an increase in RPTs is less than when foreign 
ownership is low.  
The conceptual framework of this study is presented in Figure 1 below: 
-----------------------------------------------------  
Insert Figure 1 about here 
----------------------------------------------------- 
3.0 Methodology 
3.1 Sample 
India provides an interesting platform to explore drivers of internationalization because of 
the unique history of the internationalization of Indian firms. Internationalization gained pace in 
India when the country faced a severe balance-of-payments crisis in 1991. At that time, India had 
foreign reserves that could support the import of goods for only two weeks. Consequently, the 
government realized that structural changes in the economy were required (Popli and Sinha, 2014). 
These structural changes included opening the economy and letting multinationals flock to India 
through foreign direct investment. To survive the competition, some Indian firms responded by 
internationalizing, while others attempted to save their weak business divisions by diverting 
increasingly more money into them. India is also an interesting environment for study because it 
is an emerging market (Hoskisson et al., 2000) in which corporate parents, like BGs, are more 
prominent than in any other country (Khanna and Palepu, 2010), thus providing a rich platform 
for exploring the effect of RPTs. Finally, research on internationalization in emerging markets has 
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been largely biased towards China, with comparatively less attention given to other countries 
(Jormanainen and Koveshnikov, 2012). These factors make India an important and informative 
setting in which to explore internationalization drivers.  
Our sample consisted of manufacturing sector firms in India. The Indian manufacturing 
sector is a good setting for studying internationalization, as the manufacturing sector is a key driver 
of the Indian economy. We focused on nine years of data (2005–2014); it was difficult to obtain 
annual reports of firms prior to this period from archival sources.  
We first examined all firms listed in the manufacturing sector of Prowess, a financial 
database of Indian firms, which resulted in a population of 11,030 firms. Following the approach 
of Elango and Patnaik (2007), we restricted our sample size to only those firms that exhibited 
average sales of at least $1,000,000 in the given time frame, 2005–2014. Firms beyond this sales 
level can be safely assumed to be larger and more likely to internationalize than firms under this 
level (Dass, 2000). We eliminated firms that were subsidiaries of multinational firms, were non-
group affiliated, or had missing values for financial metrics that we used in the paper. Prowess 
provides an option of segregating business group firms from stand-alone or private foreign firms; 
firms are explicitly labeled as stand-alone private, foreign, state government, or BG-owned. We 
focused on BG-affiliated firms only, as RPTs are most commonly seen in BG-affiliated firms. 
After filtering the data according to these parameters, we were left with a sample of 367 firms. 
3.2 Dependent variable operationalization 
  We measured the internationalization of the focal firm as the ratio of foreign investments 
to total investment of the firm (Bhaumik et al., 2010; Chari, 2013). Here, foreign investments refer 
to foreign direct investments, and information on these is available in Prowess. As the variable 
was skewed toward the left, an exponential operator was performed. Because of data limitations, 
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particularly in emerging economies like that of India, we could not obtain other measures for 
internationalization, such as the ratio of foreign employees to total employees or the ratio of foreign 
offices to total offices. Information on foreign investments and assets was obtained from Prowess. 
3.3 Independent variable operationalization 
RPTs. Items considered RPTs in the focal firm for each year were giving loans, advances, 
and bank guarantees; paying royalties and dividends; and investing in shares of the related parties. 
We included only these items to reflect the tunneling effect of RPTs. Information on RPTs was 
obtained from the firms’ annual reports due to incomplete information in Prowess (Srinivasan, 
2013). The transactions, as reflected in these items, were summed and divided by the total assets 
of the firm to interpret RPT in the context of firm size. 
Family ownership concentration. To measure family ownership concentration, the 
percentage of family shareholding in a firm was obtained from Prowess. 
Foreign ownership. Foreign ownership was represented by the sum of the percentage of 
foreign equity holding, including all foreign institutional investors, corporations, and individuals. 
This information was obtained from Prowess. 
Interaction effect of RPTs and family ownership concentration. A mean-centering 
technique was used to reduce the chances of multicollinearity (Osborne, 2008). First, the averages 
of both RPTs and family ownership concentrations were calculated for the entire sample, and then 
these average values were respectively subtracted from the individual RPTs and family ownership 
values. These resulting values were then multiplied with each other. 
Interaction effect of RPTs and foreign investor ownership. Using a mean-centering 
technique, the averages of RPTs and foreign ownership were first calculated for the entire sample, 
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and then each average value was respectively subtracted from the individual RPTs and foreign 
ownership values. These resulting values were then multiplied with each other.  
3.4 Control variables 
  We controlled for size of the firm (Tihanyi et al., 2003), age of the firm (Gaur and Kumar, 
2009), marketing and R&D intensity (Chari, 2013), leverage (Gaur et al., 2014), firms’ past 
performance (Bhaumik et al., 2010), and industry effects. We measured firm size using the natural 
logarithm of total employees. We measured age of the firm by taking the natural log of the total 
number of years since the firm’s inception. Marketing and R&D intensities were calculated as the 
ratio of marketing expenditure to sales and the ratio of R&D expenditure to sales, respectively. 
Leverage was measured as a debt-to-equity ratio (Bhaumik et al., 2010). Firms’ past performance 
was captured with sales growth (Chittoor at al., 2009). To control for industry effects, we used 
dummy variables in the analyses, keeping the business-to-business firms as the base category and 
coding business-to-consumer industries as 1 (Chan et al., 2012).  
 3.5 Modeling procedure 
As our data was panel in nature, we tested our hypotheses using generalized least square 
(GLS) models, which corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. A Hausman test 
confirmed that we needed to use a random effect model. GLS was appropriate for random effect 
models because it produced residuals that estimated the unit-specific serial correction of the errors 
associated with panel data; thus, the model was transformed into one with serially independent 
errors (Beck and Katz, 1995; Greene, 2000). GLS also maximized the degree of freedom (Lee and 
Song, 2012). We use the statistical software Stata for the analysis. As our analysis involved 
interaction effects, we also calculated variance inflation factors (VIF) to check if multicollinearity 
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was a problem. VIF ranged from 1.24 to 3.26, indicating that multicollinearity was not a problem 
with our sample. Thus, we estimated the following model: 
Internationalization i,t = α + β1RPTi,t-1 + β2, i,t-1 BG Concentrationi,t-1 + β3, i,t-1Foreign Equity+ β4, 
i,t-1Firm Age + β5, i,t-1Firm Size + β6, i,t-1RPT*BG concentration + β7, i,t-1RPT*Foreign Equity + β8, 
i,t-1R*D Intensity + β9, i,t-1Marekting Intensity + β10, i,t-1 Sales Growth + β11, i,t-1 Debt/Equity + β12, 
i, Industry + Years control + ε 
4.0 Results 
  This section presents the empirical models that test our hypotheses related to the 
determinants of internationalization of Indian firms. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and 
correlations, and Table 2 presents the results of GLS regression.  
-----------------------------------------------------  
Insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------------------------------------- 
-----------------------------------------------------  
Insert Table 2 about here 
----------------------------------------------------- 
From Table 1, it can be observed that average BG ownership in a focal firm was 45%, and 
foreign ownership was 11%. From a governance perspective, 45% of shareholding by BGs can be 
considered high, while 11% of foreign investor holding is low. The RPT-to-asset ratio was 0.025. 
The average marketing expenditure was 4%, while average R&D intensity was less than 1%.  
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Three models were tested in the present study, the results of which are presented in Table 
2. In Model 1, which reports a baseline model, only control variables are included. The baseline 
model performs satisfactorily, with an R2 value of 0.21. Control variables also performed in the 
expected manner. Large firms were positively associated with internationalization. Similarly, 
firms with higher R&D and marketing intensities were found to be positively associated with 
internationalization. However, we did not find any differences between business-to-business or 
business-to-consumer sectors. 
In Model 2, we include the independent variables, which in our study are hypothesized to 
influence the internationalization of EMFs. Our first hypothesis stated that internationalization is 
negatively associated with RPTs. Since the beta coefficient of RPTs is negative and significant (β 
= -0.14, p<0.001), we receive evidence in support of the first hypothesis. Thus, firms that channel 
money to sister concerns through RPTs exhibit a lower preference for internationalization, 
indicating that firms with poor corporate governance are less likely to internationalize.  
It was interesting to observe that with an increase in BG ownership concentration, 
internationalization decreased. Our second hypothesis predicted a moderating impact of family 
ownership concentration in a BG on the relationship between RPTs and internationalization. Our 
results indicate that the beta coefficient of the interaction between RPTs and family ownership 
concentration is significant (β = -0.10 p<0.001). Graphical representation of this interaction term 
is presented in Figure 2. As can be observed from Figure 2, when the ownership concentration is 
high, there is a greater decrease in internationalization associated with the increase in RPTs, 
compared to cases when the family ownership concentration is low. This implies that the 
concentrated ownership of family members enhances the negative impact of RPTs on 
internationalization. Thus, we receive evidence in support of our second hypothesis. This clearly 
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indicates that family members do not promote risky strategies, such as internationalization, and 
prefer to tunnel slack resources through RPTs.  
Our third hypothesis predicted a moderating impact of foreign ownership on the 
relationship between RPTs and internationalization. Model 3 in Table 2 shows that the beta 
coefficient of the interaction term between foreign ownership and RPTs is statistically significant 
(β = 0.12, p<0.001). Graphical representation of this relationship is presented in Figure 3. As can 
be observed from Figure 3, when foreign ownership is high, there is a small decrease in 
internationalization associated with an increase in RPTs. When foreign ownership is low, there is 
a much higher decrease in internationalization associated with an increase in RPTs. Thus, we 
receive evidence in support of our third hypothesis. Our results clearly indicate that foreign 
investors prefer internationalization, which reduces the negative impact of RPTs on 
internationalization.  
-----------------------------------------------------  
Insert Figure 2 about here 
----------------------------------------------------- 
-----------------------------------------------------  
Insert Figure 3 about here 
----------------------------------------------------- 
4.1 Robustness test 
Although previous studies did not report RPT as an endogenous variable, in order to 
mitigate the possible endogeneity problem, we used a two-stage least square regression in Stata. 
In order to estimate an instrumental variables regression for panel data, an exogenous instrument 
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for RPT was required. Wooldridge (2008) suggested that a good instrument is one that is: (1) 
correlated with the endogenous independent variable, RPT in this case, and (2) uncorrelated with 
the error term. Industry‐ level RPT was a good instrument for the endogenous independent 
variable, as industry-level RPT could influence firm-level RPT, but it was unlikely to be correlated 
with the internationalization of the focal firm. Such industry-level exogenous instruments have 
been used in extant literature on emerging market firms as well (Chittoor et al., 2015). The beta 
coefficient of industry-level RPT was positive but insignificant, indicating that endogeneity was 
not an issue. Refer to table 3 for details. 
We further sub-divided our group-affiliated sample of firms into firms associated with top 
50, top 100, and other BGs, based on sales. We checked if the relationship between RPTs, 
moderators, and firm performance varied across different types of business groups. Overall, 
although significance levels differed, results remained significant. We lagged RPTs up to three 
years to check for sensitivity of the lag period. Although the beta coefficient and significance level 
changed, results remained qualitatively unchanged.  
-----------------------------------------------------  
Insert Table 3 about here 
----------------------------------------------------- 
5.0 Discussion and conclusion 
Internationalization of firms from a governance perspective has recently received a great 
deal of attention (Bhaumik et al., 2010; Filatotchev et al., 2008; Mitter et al., 2014). Although the 
role of several governance factors, such as the board of directors, has been examined (Singla et al., 
2014), RPTs have not received any attention in context of internationalization. Gordon et al. (2004) 
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stated that diverse and complex RPTs represented a corporate governance challenge, thus raising 
the importance of exploring the impact of RPTs on strategic outcomes, such as internationalization.  
In this study, we examined the relationship between RPTs and EMF internationalization, 
as well as the moderating effect of a firm’s ownership structure on the relationship between RPTs 
and internationalization. We expected that, due to several negative implications imposed by RPTs, 
there would be a negative relationship between RPTs and internationalization. We expected that 
family ownership in BG-affiliated firms would further enhance the negative relationship between 
RPTs and internationalization, whereas an increase in equity stakes by foreign investors would 
weaken the negative impact of RPTs on internationalization.  
We found support for a negative relationship between RPTs and internationalization. This 
indicates that the impact of RPTs on a firm’s strategic decisions is not different from their impact 
on other organizational outcomes, such as firm performance, which they have been found to 
adversely affect (Ryngaert and Thomas, 2012). RPTs were also found to adversely impact earnings 
management by firms (Jiang et al., 2010), CEO compensation (Balsam et al., 2017), earnings rate 
(Cho and Lim, 2018), and several other firm-level outcomes. On similar lines, we found that RPTs 
adversely influenced the internationalization of EMFs. The negative effect of RPTs on a firm’s 
internationalization indicates that RPTs weaken the corporate governance system of the focal firm 
(Kohlbeck and Mayhew, 2017), which raises challenges for EMFs to internationalize. Although 
RPTs can sometimes benefit firms, they are considered a negative signal of corporate governance 
(Kohlbeck and Mayhew, 2010; Yeh et al., 2012); this can have an adverse impact on 
internationalization. Our results are consistent with the theory of internationalization in which 
governance factors have a significant impact on how firms manage their foreign direct investment 
(Hu and Cui, 2014; Singh and Gaur, 2013; Singla et al., 2014).  
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Our findings also show that the ownership structure of BGs influences the relationship 
between RPTs and internationalization, such that increased family ownership concentration in BGs 
amplifies the negative relationship. The ownership concentration of BGs has been found to 
negatively influence outgoing FDI (Filatotchev et al., 2008; Lin, 2012), international sales 
(Calabrò et al., 2017), international entrepreneurship (Sciascia et al., 2012), and organizational 
learning outcomes (Zahra, 2012). Our findings indicate that ownership concentration not only has 
a negative direct impact on firm outcomes such as internationalization, it even negatively 
moderates the impact of other governance variables, such as RPT, on internationalization. With 
regards to this negative moderating effect, our findings are in corroboration with extant studies 
where family ownership has been found to influence the relationships between R&D and CEO 
compensation (Tsao et al., 2015) and between entrepreneurial orientation and firm performance 
(Campbell et al., 2010), although direct evidence on the moderating effect of BGs is missing.  
Our findings also indicate that exploring the role of BGs through affiliation rather than 
ownership structure can yield different results. Some studies indicate a positive impact of BG 
affiliation on internationalization, while others report a negative impact (Chari, 2013; Iona et al., 
2013; Kim and Song, 2016; Singh and Gaur, 2009). This difference in findings may have occurred 
because we considered shareholding structure rather than mere group affiliation. It is interesting 
to see that although BGs can provide intangible network resources to affiliated firms for 
internationalization (Elango and Patnaik, 2007; Gubbi et al., 2010; Yiu et al., 2005), RPTs can 
void the benefits of intangible resources of BG-affiliated firms, as firms are unable to 
internationalize or only able to internationalize to a lesser extent due to heighted LOE or LOF.  
Unlike family members in BGs, foreign equity investors prefer internationalization, as they 
have potential resources that can help in expanding overseas. They can help reduce LOE by 
25 
 
providing network resources in international markets. Despite poor protection of the rights of 
minority investors, foreign investors, through active monitoring mechanisms, diminish the 
negative impact that RPTs can have on internationalization. This may happen because foreign 
investors are able to leverage their international networks to raise external funding and reduce 
operational risks in international markets by providing critical informational resources. In this way, 
our findings are consistent with extant literature showing that high foreign equity ownership 
among Indian firms was associated with a higher propensity for internationalization (Chittoor et 
al., 2015; Bhaumik et al., 2010; Elango and Pattnaik, 2007). However, our findings contrast with 
the role of foreign investors in developed markets, where these investors were found to be less 
involved in the governance aspect of firms (Kang et al., 2010). Refer to table 4 for summary of 
results. 
-----------------------------------------------------  
Insert Table 4 about here 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Our findings are consistent with extant literature, where governance traits, such as board 
independence or family ownership, were found to moderate the relationship between RPTs and 
firm performance (Aswadi et al., 2011). We found a moderating impact of other governance traits, 
the ownership structure of a firm and its impact on the RPT/internationalization relationship.  
Overall, we found support for our hypothesis on the impact of RPTs on a firm’s 
internationalization under the boundary conditions of the firm’s BG and foreign investors’ 
ownership. Our findings indicate that RPTs, especially in emerging markets, can be a significant 
inhibitor of internationalization. Additionally, our study points to a need to explore this 
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relationship in other emerging markets as well. Given the developing nature of theory for emerging 
markets, replication of this study in a different country context might produce different results. 
The conflicts between foreign investors and family owners in a BG reflect differences in perception 
and interest, such as risk-averse behavior vs. risk-taking behavior. Internationalization and 
corporate governance literature can be further enriched by directly exploring why these differences 
in behavior exist. Finally, the scant literature on EMFs and the uniqueness of the governance 
characteristics in these markets make the findings of our study interesting. 
This study has several limitations as well. The study is based on a sample of Indian firms, 
which limits the generalizability of our findings to other contexts. Future studies should explore 
this relationship in other emerging economies. Additionally, we tested for only one factor, 
ownership structure, which might affect the relationship between RPTs and internationalization. 
Future studies could consider other context-specific factors, such as the home country’s 
institutional and cultural environments. One possible approach to incorporating these factors could 
be to conduct case studies on a few firms to qualitatively analyze the impact of different 
institutional and cultural contexts on the performance of internationalizing firms. We also assert 
that RPTs impact internationalization through capital markets.  
We acknowledge that there could be significant variance across sectors. This is a potential 
weakness of our study, in that it limits the external validity of our results. Future studies should 
address this limitation by analyzing the relationship between RPTs and internationalization for 
specific sectors. Given that certain sectors in emerging economies, such as computer software and 
pharmaceuticals, have gained far greater international prominence than other sectors, it is likely 
that the relationship between RPTs and internationalization is different in different sectors. We 
assume, based on resource dependency theory, that RPTs result in resource scarcity that cannot be 
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fulfilled by either internal or external capital markets. However, testing mechanisms through 
which RPTs shape resource availability were beyond the scope of this study and are hence a 
limitation of the study. We did not segregate different types of RPTs to explore their impact on 
internationalization, although extant literature in finance and accounting indicates that not all RPTs 
are disadvantageous for firms (Fang et al., 2018). 
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Table 1- Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
    Mean S.D 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 
International 
Diversification 
(exponential 
form) 
1.02 0.13 1             
2 RPT/Asset 0.025 1.36 − 0.20*** 1           
3 
Ownership 
Concentration 
(of Family 
Members) 
0.45 1.23 -0.17** 0.12*** 1         
4 
Foreign 
Ownership 
0.11 0.32 0.24*** 
-
0.11*** 
-
0.12*** 
1       
5 Firm Size 8.07 9.15 0.10* 0.10*** 0.001 0.04*** 1     
6 Firm Age 3.72 0.89 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.02 0.06*** 1   
7 
Marketing 
Intensity 
0.04 0.06 0.010*** 0.01 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.07*** 0.002 1 
8 R&D intensity 0.00 0.021 0.01 0.00  0.03** 0.05*** 0.03** 0.005 0.00 
9 Debt to Equity 1.28 2.45 0.004 -0.04** 0.06*** 0.01 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.002 
10 
Past 
performance 
2.47 5.89 0.12*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.11*** 0.00 0.04** 
***, p<.000; **, p<.01; *, p<.05;  
 
44 
 
Table 2 
Multiple Linear Regression Results of Impact of RPT on International Diversification 
Dependent Variable: International 
Diversification 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
RPT 
 
− 0.14*** 
(0.04) 
− 0.15*** 
 (0.05) 
Ownership Concentration (of 
Family Members) 
 
-0.08** 
(0.03) 
-0.10* 
(0.04) 
Foreign Ownership 
 
0.11*** 
(0.03) 
0.13***  
(0.04) 
RPT*Ownership Concentration 
(of Family Members) 
  
 -0.10*** 
  (0.03) 
RPT* Foreign Ownership 
  
 0.12*** 
(0.04) 
Firm Size 
   0.07*** 
(0.02) 
      0.08 ** 
(0.3 
  0.09** 
(0.04) 
Firm Age 
0.02  
(0.08) 
0.03  
(0.09) 
0.01 
 (0.010) 
Marketing Intensity 
1.12*  
(0.49) 
   1.16* * 
(0.54) 
1.19** 
 (0.56) 
R&D Intensity 
   0.71** 
 (0.24) 
   0.73**  
(0.25) 
0.75**  
(0.28) 
45 
 
Industry 
0.13  
(0.08) 
0.12 
(0.07) 
  0.12 
  (0.09) 
Debt Equity Ratio 
0.16                            
(0.12) 
0.18 
(0.12) 
0.18 
(0.13) 
Past Performance 
0.23** 
(0.08) 
0.21* 
(0.10) 
0.19* 
(0.09) 
R2 0.21 0.24 0.26 
Observations 3303 3303 3303 
 
*** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<0.05 s.e. are in parentheses 
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Table 3: Result of Instrumental variable Regression 
 
 
Dependent Variable: International 
Diversification 
Model 1 Model 2 
Industry RPT 
0.74 
(0.45) 
 
RPT 
 
− 0.11*** 
(0.04) 
Ownership Concentration (of 
Family Members) 
-0.06* 
(0.03) 
-0.09*** 
(0.03) 
Foreign Ownership 
0.10*** 
(0.03) 
0.14*** 
(0.05) 
RPT*Ownership Concentration (of 
Family Members) 
-0.12*** 
(0.04) 
-0.07*** 
(0.02) 
RPT* Foreign Ownership 
-0.11*** 
(0.03) 
-0.13*** 
(0.04) 
Firm Size 
   0.08 *** 
(0.02) 
      0.10 *** 
(0.03) 
Firm Age 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.04  
(0.03) 
Marketing Intensity 0.98    0.81 
47 
 
(0.42) (0.23) 
R&D Intensity 
   0.86* 
 (0.32) 
   0.77**  
(0.29) 
Industry 
0.10  
(0.09) 
0.13  
(0.08) 
Debt Equity Ratio 
0.18                             
(0.12) 
0.14 
(0.09) 
Past Performance 
0.24* 
(0.10) 
0.20* 
(0.08) 
R2  0.25 
Observations 3303 3303 
 
*** p<.001; ** p<.01, *p<0.05 
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Table 4: Summary of results 
Hypothesis Beta Value & Significance Support/Rejection 
Hypothesis 1 β = -0.14, p<0.01 Supported 
Hypothesis 2 β = -0.10, p<0.01 Supported 
Hypothesis 3 β = 0.12, p<0.01 Supported 
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Figure 1 
Conceptual Framework 
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Figure 2 
Moderating Impact of Ownership Concentration of Family Members on RPT and International 
Diversification  
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Figure 3  
Moderating Impact of Foreign Ownership on RPT and International Diversification 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
